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CULPABILITY THROUGH ANONYMITY: WHY 
NAVARETTE V. CALIFORNIA VASTLY 
LOWERS THE STANDARD FOR REASONABLE 
SUSPICION BASED SOLELY ON 
 ANONYMOUS TIPS 
Joshua Aberman∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
“Report Drunk Drivers, Call 911.” All California motorists, or at 
least those who pay attention to signs posted along the highway, are 
familiar with this simple message.1 Beginning in 2007, the California 
Office of Traffic Safety began a series of driving under the influence 
(DUI) crackdown campaigns, prominently featuring these signs as a 
means of raising awareness of, and combating, drunk driving.2 The 
goal behind these signs is a simple one: to encourage motorists who 
observe erratic driving behavior to report any suspected drunk 
drivers so that police can investigate and take appropriate action.3 
Given the undeniably devastating effect that drunk driving wreaks 
upon families and communities alike, there is tremendous support for 
efforts to curtail and punish this destructive behavior.4 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Sociology,
University of California, Davis, 2010. Thank you to Professor Justin Levitt for his guidance and 
valuable feedback in preparing this Comment. Thank you to the members of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review for their hard work and dedication. A special thank you to my sister and 
personal editor-in-chief for her help. Finally, thank you to my parents and family for their 
unconditional support and encouragement. 
1. DUI Crackdown, CAL. OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, http://www.ots.ca.gov/media_and
_research/Campaigns/2010_December_DUI_Crackdown/default.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2014) 
(“How often have you seen someone driving down the road that you were pretty sure was drunk, 
or at least driving dangerously? Haven’t you said to yourself, ‘I wish a police officer was here to 
see this and pull this guy over!’ Now . . . you can do something to help get drunk drivers off the 
road.”). 
2. See Past Campaigns, CAL. OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, http://www.ots.ca.gov/Media
_and_Research/Campaigns/Past_Campaigns/default.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
3. DUI Crackdown, supra note 1.
4. Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Apr. 17, 2013),   http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv 
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However, while stopping drunk driving is a necessary pursuit, 
California’s implementation of a system centered on encouraging 
motorists to report suspected drunk drivers is not a perfect one. 
While these tips may direct police to potential drunk drivers, they do 
not authorize the police to execute investigative stops, searches, or 
seizures that fail to comport with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. In fact, the Fourth Amendment, which protects “against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,”5 is seriously undermined when 
police can justify a search based on nothing more than an 
uncorroborated tip, left anonymously,6 which may have been 
provided for a malicious reason such as to embarrass the target or to 
create a pretense to search for evidence of other crimes.7 
Chief among these concerns, from a constitutional standpoint, is 
that individuals may avail themselves of the opportunity to report 
drunk drivers anonymously.8 The resulting problem, entirely distinct 
from the issue of drunk driving, is when, and under what 
circumstances, a police officer can pull a car over based on an 
anonymous tip. The United States Supreme Court confronted this 
issue during its 2013 term in Navarette v. California.9 
In Navarette, a bare majority of the Supreme Court decided 
what it termed a “close case” and concluded that an anonymous tip 
reporting reckless driving gives police reasonable suspicion to pull 
over the identified car.10 On the other hand, the four dissenting 
_factsheet.html (“Every day, almost 30 people in the United States die in motor vehicle crashes 
that involve an alcohol-impaired driver. This amounts to one death every 48 minutes. The annual 
cost of alcohol-related crashes totals more than $51 billion.”). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Public Information—Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY,
http://www.ots.ca.gov/Media_and_Research/Campaigns/2008_December_DUI_Crackdown/Publi
c_Information/FAQs.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2014). 
7. E.g., Bradley Zint, Private Eye Takes the 5th More Than 200 Times in Fake-DUI Case,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-private-detective-dui
-lawsuit-20140324-story.html (detailing how a private detective falsely reported that a mayor was
driving erratically and likely drunk); Marin County Family Falls Victim To ‘Swatting,’ Hoax 911
Calls Become Growing Problem For Police, CBS SF BAY AREA (Sept. 3, 2014, 8:01 PM),
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/09/03/marin-county-family-falls-victim-to-swatting-hoax
-911-calls-become-growing-problem-for-police-prank-fairfax-celebrities-kardashian-justin
-bieber-ashton-kutcher/ (describing several incidents of hoax 911 calls in California).
8. Public Information—Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6 (“[Q:] Do I have to give
my name if I call to report a suspected drunk driver? [A:] No. You can remain anonymous.” 
(emphasis removed)).  
9. 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
10. Id. at 1692.
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Justices opined that the Court’s decision amounted to a “freedom 
destroying cocktail.”11 
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual background of 
Navarette. Part III considers the relevant legal background informing 
investigative stops and reasonable suspicion based on anonymous 
tips. Part IV sets forth the reasoning that the Court adopted in 
holding that the police officers’ investigative stop did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because the officers had reasonable suspicion of 
an ongoing crime based on an anonymous tip. Part V questions the 
faulty reasoning and inconsistent application of precedent that forms 
the basis of the Navarette decision. Ultimately, Part VI concludes 
with the likely practical consequences of the Navarette decision, 
focusing on the probable expansion of police officers’ discretion to 
conduct investigatory stops based on anonymous tips at the cost of 
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights.  
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 23, 2008, a 911 emergency dispatcher received a call 
from an anonymous12 motorist.13 The motorist claimed that she had 
just been run off the road by a reckless driver.14 The motorist then 
supplied the 911 dispatcher with the make, model, and license plate 
number of the car.15 The 911 dispatcher passed this tip to a 
California Highway Patrol (CHP) police dispatcher, who recorded 
and broadcasted the message to police as “[s]howing southbound 
Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8–
David–94925. Ran the reporting party off the roadway and was last 
seen approximately five [minutes] ago.”16 
Based on this tip, a CHP officer responded to Highway 1 and 
located a silver truck, with a license plate matching the one reported 
11. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. The caller actually identified herself by name in the 911 recording. See id. at 1687 n. 1
(majority opinion). However, the trial court and all subsequent reviewing courts treated the caller 
as anonymous because the 911 recording was not introduced into evidence during the suppression 
hearing, meaning that the caller’s identity was not part of the record. Id.; see also Garrett Epps, 
Can an Anonymous Tip Get You Arrested for Drunk Driving?, THE ATLANTIC (May 14, 2014, 
9:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/05/navarettevcalifornia/370803/?sin
gle_page=true (explaining why the 911 call was not introduced during the suppression hearing). 
13. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87.
14. Id. at 1687.
15. Id. at 1686–87.
16. Id.
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by the anonymous tipster, around thirteen minutes after the dispatch 
call, at mile marker 69.17 The CHP officer followed the truck for 
approximately five minutes.18 During this period, the operator of the 
truck did not drive erratically or perform any other vehicular 
maneuvers that would have given the surveilling police officers 
probable cause to pull over a motorist.19 Nevertheless, the officer 
pulled over the truck and was soon joined by a second officer who 
had separately responded to the broadcasted message.20 
When the two officers approached the truck, they smelled 
marijuana.21 The officers subsequently searched the vehicle and 
discovered thirty pounds of marijuana in the truck bed.22 As a result, 
the officers arrested the driver of the truck, Lorenzo Navarette, and 
his passenger and brother, José Navarette.23 
At trial, the Navarette brothers sought to suppress the evidence 
seized during the search of the truck. They argued the arresting 
officers pulled over the vehicle without the requisite reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity that would have made the search 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.24 The trial 
judge rejected this argument and admitted the seized marijuana into 
evidence.25 The Navarette brothers pleaded guilty to transporting 
marijuana and received a sentence of ninety days in jail and three 
years of probation.26 The California Court of Appeal affirmed the 
trial court’s determination as to the marijuana’s admissibility and the 
Navarette brothers’ subsequent sentencing.27 The California Supreme 
Court declined to review the case and the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.28 
17. Id. at 1687.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 1687; id. at 1696 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the driving during the five
minutes of surveillance was “irreproachable” and that the officers did not witness a single traffic 
law violation). 
20. Id. at 1687 (majority opinion).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. People v. Navarette, No. A132353, 2012 WL 4842651 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2012),
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
28. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.
Winter 2014] REASONABLE SUSPICION 543 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a holding first 
articulated in its seminal decision Terry v. Ohio,29 and subsequently 
developed by numerous cases: “in justifying the particular intrusion 
the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”30 This standard, which is 
commonly referred to as reasonable suspicion,31 is determined under 
the totality of the circumstances32 and “is dependent upon both the 
content of information possessed by police and its degree of 
reliability.”33 
These general principles governing Terry stops are particularly 
important in cases where the reasonable suspicion for the Terry stop 
is justified by an anonymous tip. The Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area is buttressed by two guidepost decisions determining whether an 
anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion: Alabama v. White34 
and Florida v. J.L.35 
In White, a divided Court held that an anonymous tip provided 
police officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative 
stop. The White tipster predicted that a woman named Vanessa 
White would leave a certain apartment building at a particular time, 
driving a distinct brown, Plymouth station wagon with a broken tail 
light, en route to a local motel, and carrying a brown attaché 
containing cocaine.36 The officers placed Ms. White under 
surveillance and confirmed almost all of the detailed predictions of 
the anonymous tip.37 The Court found it significant that the tipster 
was able to predict the future actions of a third party, ultimately 
29. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
30. Id. The Navarette Court relied on a slightly different phrasing of this principle: “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 
activity.” 134 S. Ct. at 1687 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). 
31. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214,
217–23 (1983). 
32. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417.
33. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
34. Id.
35. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
36. White, 496 U.S. at 327.
37. Id. The Court noted that the officers did not corroborate every part of the tip, such as the
name of the woman, but did corroborate the majority of the tipster’s predictions. See id. at 331. 
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holding that “the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient 
indicia of reliability to justify [an] investigatory stop.”38 
On the other hand, in J.L., a unanimous Court held that an 
anonymous tip did not provide reasonable suspicion for an 
investigative stop.39 The anonymous tipster in J.L. reported that a 
young black male would be standing at a particular bus stop, wearing 
a plaid shirt, and carrying a gun.40 The Court held that this tip lacked 
the indicia of reliability present in White.41 Specifically, the Court 
primarily focused on the lack of a predictive assertion revealing the 
tipster’s special familiarity with the suspect, and subsequent police 
corroboration of the tip, which failed to sufficiently justify the 
police’s investigative stop.42 Furthermore, the Court expressly 
refused to find that the anonymous tip was reliable based on the tip’s 
description of readily observable information regarding location and 
appearance because such information does not reveal how a tipster 
has knowledge of concealed criminal activity.43 
IV. THE REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
Writing for the Navarette majority,44 Justice Thomas began his 
analysis of the anonymous tip’s reliability by observing that the 
anonymous informant, by virtue of claiming that she was run off the 
road, possessed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged reckless 
driving.45 This first-hand knowledge entitled the tip to increased 
reliability.46 Furthermore, the majority reasoned that this knowledge 
made the reliability of the anonymous tipster stronger than that of the 
38. Id. at 332. For a discussion criticizing the White Court’s decision to find reasonable
suspicion based on an anonymous tip, see Orrin S. Shifrin, Fourth Amendment—Protection 
Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure: The Inadequacies of Using an Anonymous Tip to 
Provide Reasonable Suspicion for an Investigatory Stop, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 760 
(1991). 
39. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 271.
42. Id. at 272–74.
43. Id. at 272.
44. Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, and
Kennedy. 
45. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
46. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983) (“[An informant’s] explicit and
detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed 
firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.”)). 
Winter 2014] REASONABLE SUSPICION 545 
tipster in either White or J.L. because the police officers definitively 
knew how the Navarette tipster allegedly came to acquire her 
information.47 And, as with both cases, the detaining police officer 
was able to corroborate the tip’s factual assertions as to the car’s 
defining characteristics and approximate location.48  
Additionally, the majority relied on principles of evidentiary 
admissibility to hold that the tip was reliable.49 The Court looked to 
the timeline of events to infer the approximate time of the 
near-accident and concluded that the account of the accident given 
during the 911 call amounted to either a present sense impression or 
an excited utterance.50 These types of statements are considered more 
reliable than most other out-of-court statements.51 Moreover, the 
Court reasoned that the fact that the call was placed to 911, which 
allows for recording, identifying, and tracing calls, ameliorates the 
potential for abuses of anonymous tips and increases the reliability of 
reports placed into such a system.52 
The Court next looked to whether the tip created reasonable 
suspicion of ongoing criminal activity so as to justify an investigative 
stop under Terry.53 Therefore, the court was confronted with the 
issue of whether the tip, which described precisely one incident of 
reckless driving and contained no express assertion of drunk driving, 
created “reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk 
driving.”54 While noting that not all traffic violations imply 
intoxication, the Court relied on data analyzing symptoms of drunk 
driving to conclude that an allegation of weaving or driving over a 
center median line implies drunkenness.55 The Court then reasoned 
that the allegation that the informant had been run off the road was 
the type of conduct that “bears too great a resemblance to 
paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving” because it “suggests 
47. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1688–89.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1689–90.
50. Id. at 1689.
51. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(1), 803(2)).
52. Id. at 1689–90.
53. Id. at 1690–92.
54. Id. at 1690.
55. Id. at 1690–91. The Court relied on “the accumulated experience of thousands
of officers” to determine which types of “erratic behaviors are strongly correlated with 
drunk driving.” Id. at 1691 (citing NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE  
VISUAL DETECTION OF DWI MOTORISTS 4–5 (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/808677.pdf). 
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lane-positioning problems, decreased vigilance, impaired judgment, 
or some combination of those recognized drunk driving cues.”56 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly found that the fact that 
the police officers had not personally observed any driving behaviors 
associated with drunk driving, which undermines rather than 
corroborates the anonymous tip, did not invalidate the officer’s 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.57 
The Court concluded that while this was a “close case,” the 
anonymous tip had sufficient indicia of reliability such that, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the police officers had reasonable 
suspicion to execute an investigative stop.58 As a result, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the California Court of Appeal and ruled the evidence 
collected during the traffic stop admissible.59 
B. Dissent
Writing for the dissenting Justices,60 Justice Scalia emphatically 
argued that the anonymous tip that was the subject of the case could 
not possibly give rise to reasonable suspicion under Terry, White, or 
J.L. Instead, the dissent argued, the majority opinion adopted a
position accepted by several other courts61 but never by the Supreme
Court: that an anonymous and uncorroborated tip regarding a
possibly intoxicated driver provides reasonable suspicion for an
investigative stop.62
Principally, the dissent strongly questioned the majority’s 
reliance on White.63 The only predictive value of the Navarette tip 
that could have aided the police in assessing the anonymous 
informant’s reliability was that a silver truck would be heading south 
on Highway 1. This falls far short of the predictive tip in White, 
which revealed to the police officers that the anonymous informant 
had a basis for knowing the otherwise unobservable fact that 
Ms. White would be carrying contraband.64 Instead, the description 
56. Id. at 1691.
57. Id. (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002)).
58. Id. at 1692.
59. Id.
60. Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
61. E.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 729–30; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 814
(Cal. 2006); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626–27, 630 (Iowa 2001). 
62. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1693.
64. Id.
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of the truck and its direction on the highway was information that 
would have been immediately discernible to anyone observing the 
truck.65 It provided no basis to conclude that the tipster possessed 
familiarity with the truck driver’s personal affairs such that the police 
could reasonably believe the informant had a basis for the assertion 
of illegal activity.66 
Next, the dissent criticized the majority for relying on the fact 
that the anonymous tip qualified as a present sense impression or an 
excited utterance, making the statements more reliable as a matter of 
evidentiary law.67 The dissent pointed out that the tip likely lacked 
the immediacy necessary to qualify as a present sense impression or 
an excited utterance because a significant amount of time necessarily 
passed between the near-accident and its anonymous report.68 
Moreover, because it was attributed to an anonymous source, the tip 
was significantly less likely to enjoy the presumption of reliability 
that normally attaches to either present sense impressions or excited 
utterances.69 Additionally, the dissent argued that the fact that the 
statement was placed to 911, and thus was recorded, did not affect 
the reliability of the information, particularly where the informant 
was unaware that her call was being recorded and could later be 
traced and identified.70 
Furthermore, the dissent highlighted that the anonymous tip did 
not contain an actual report of drunk driving, instead describing a 
single instance of reckless driving.71 Because the standard required to 
justify an investigative stop is evidence of ongoing criminal activity, 
the dissent argued that a report of a single incident of careless or 
reckless driving, explainable by any number of reasons,72 fell far 
short of asserting ongoing criminal activity.73 
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1694 (citing 2 K. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 362, 367–69 (7th ed. 2013)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK] (“There is no such immediacy here. The declarant had time to observe 
the license number of the offending vehicle, . . . to bring her car to a halt, to copy down the 
observed license number (presumably), and (if she was using her own cell phone) to dial a call to 
the police from the stopped car. Plenty of time to dissemble or embellish.”)). 
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1695.
72. The dissent points to use of a cell phone, an intense sports argument, personal animus
based on a “Make Love, Not War” bumper sticker, carelessness, and recklessness as equally 
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Finally, the dissent pointed to the police officer’s decision to 
follow the Navarettes’ silver truck for five minutes, ostensibly for the 
purpose of confirming reckless driving, as the final blow to any 
credible assertion that the police officers possessed reasonable 
suspicion of an ongoing crime.74 While lauding this as good police 
work, the dissent asserted that the police officer’s failure to identify 
any traffic violations within the surveillance period meant that the 
anonymous tip was not just uncorroborated, but actively 
undermined.75 Therefore, because a drunk driver possesses no ability 
to “turn off” the symptoms of drunk driving, the police officer’s 
failure to observe any behavior consistent with driving while 
intoxicated foreclosed the possibility of any reasonable suspicion of 
drunk driving.76 Thus, the dissent would have held that the 
investigative stop of the car was unconstitutional.77 
V. ANALYSIS
This Comment will analyze the majority’s faulty logic in two 
main contexts: first, in finding reliability based on a tip’s contents 
qualifying as a hearsay exception, and second, in overstating the 
importance of the tip’s permanent recording. Next, this Comment 
will evaluate Navarette as an application of J.L., rather than as a 
minimization of White’s predictive tip requirement. Finally, it will 
examine how lower courts are likely to interpret and apply Navarette 
to future cases involving anonymous tips. 
A. The Navarette Decision Was Premised on Faulty Reasoning
1. Evidentiary Rules of Trial Admissibility Should Not Inform the
Determination of an Officer’s Reasonable Suspicion
As a matter of evidentiary law, the rule against hearsay requires
that out-of-court statements be excluded at trial when offered for 
their truth.78 An exception to this general exclusionary rule attaches 
when the statement is a present sense impression or an excited 
likely reasons for the Navarettes’ driving behavior which caused the anonymous informant to be 
run off the road. Id. 
73. Id. at 1695–96.
74. Id. at 1696–97.
75. Id. at 1696.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1697.
78. FED. R. EVID. 801(c); MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 182–83.
Winter 2014] REASONABLE SUSPICION 549 
utterance, under the rationale that the declarant has not had the 
necessary time to fabricate a lie.79 The Navarette dissent makes 
strong points regarding the tip’s likelihood of not being sufficiently 
immediate to qualify under either of these exceptions.80 It also raises 
serious concerns about whether statements that may be classified as 
excited utterances or present sense impressions, but for the fact that 
they were said anonymously, are entitled to the same presumption of 
reliability.81  
However, one fundamental question must be asked 
preliminarily: Why look to hearsay exceptions to inform the 
reliability of an anonymous tip for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment? The evidentiary admissibility of an anonymous tip only 
comes into play if police officers act on the anonymous tip, discover 
evidence of illegal activity, charges are brought by a prosecutor, and 
a judge rules the evidence admissible because it was collected during 
a search that was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Then, and 
only then, is a trial held where the tip, as an out-of-court statement, 
may be offered for its truth. Duplicating the evidentiary exception 
relevant at trial as the indicia of Fourth Amendment compliance in 
investigative stops might intuitively seem like a good idea because it 
creates consistency in what is “reliable,” but in fact, such a procedure 
commits the logical fallacy of circular reasoning. 
While it is true that the totality of the circumstances must be 
considered to assess the reliability of an anonymous tip, the rationale 
for admitting present sense impressions or excited utterances—that 
there has been no time to fabricate a lie—is not at all relevant as an 
indicia of reliability.82 The Fourth Amendment asks whether an 
anonymous tip contains sufficient indicia of reliability to support “a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity,” rather than the likelihood that the 
informant fabricated information.83 The required indicia of 
79. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (defining a present sense impression as “[a] statement describing or
explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it”); id. 
at 803(2) (defining an excited utterance as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused”).  
80. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1693–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1694 (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 367–69).
82. See FED. R. EVID. 401; see FED. R. EVID. 402.
83. United State v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–
22 (1968). 
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reliability84 has never previously been informed by whether the tip 
ultimately turned out to be true.85 If that were not the case, then the 
proper method of analysis would simply ask whether the tip turned 
out to be true and then retroactively deem it reliable or unreliable 
based on that result.  
However, ultimate truth is the only point on which a present 
sense impression or excited utterance is more reliable than other 
out-of-court statements in the context of admissibility; these types of 
spontaneous statements are generally considered to be more reliable 
because there has been insufficient time to fabricate them.86 Ultimate 
truth neither gives police reason to believe that the informant himself 
is more reliable nor provides an anonymous tip with sufficient 
indicia of reliability to give rise to reasonable suspicion. This is 
necessarily true because a determination as to an anonymous tip’s 
ultimate truth can only be made after police have already acted based 
on the tip, but reasonable suspicion must exist prior to such action. 
Navarette ignores this logic entirely. Instead, under Navarette, 
an investigative stop is justified because an anonymous tip qualified 
as an excited utterance or present sense impression and, if evidence 
of a crime is subsequently uncovered, an individual will be 
prosecuted based on a seizure that did not comply with the Fourth 
Amendment, thus completing the circular reasoning loop. 
Additionally, to the extent that reasonable suspicion requires a 
police officer to specifically articulate the grounds for his belief of 
ongoing criminal activity, evidentiary rules are wholly irrelevant.87 A 
tip is usually conveyed to a police officer through the combination of 
a 911 dispatcher and a police dispatcher.88 It is highly improbable 
that a police officer, hearing a dispatcher’s report, would think, much 
less have sufficient information to conclusively determine, that an 
anonymous tip is sufficiently credible because it appears to recount a 
84. See Part V.B, infra.
85. In J.L. it did not matter that the defendant was actually found carrying a gun, and in
White it did not matter that the defendant was actually in possession of cocaine. See generally 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). Indeed, Navarette 
held that the police officer possessed reasonable suspicion despite the fact that the defendant was 
not ultimately driving while intoxicated. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687. 
86. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (“The basis for the ‘excited utterance’
exception, for example, is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the 
possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation . . . .”); MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 365. 
87. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
88. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87.
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very recent event, possibly while the tipster is still in an excited 
state.89 As such, the applicability of a hearsay exception could not, 
and should not, influence the determination of an anonymous tip’s 
reliability. 
2. The Navarette Court Created a Per Se Rule Allowing for
Reasonable Suspicion Based on Anonymous 
911 Reports of Moving Violations 
The Navarette Court listed several laws and regulations that 
allow individuals to listen to a false tipster’s voice and subject him or 
her to prosecution, and concluded that this increased the veracity of a 
tipster’s claims.90 In so doing, the Court purported not to create a 
new exception to 911 calls, claiming that “[n]one of this is to suggest 
that tips in 911 calls are per se reliable.”91 However, the very next 
line of the opinion admits that “a reasonable officer could conclude 
that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system.”92 
Therefore, the Court’s reasoning can be applied to any recorded 
call, 911 or otherwise, and such a call may be used as the basis for a 
police officer’s reasonable suspicion.93 Going forward, by way of 
analogy to Navarette, the Court created a per se rule recognizing 
anonymous tips reported through 911 as sufficiently reliable to 
provide an officer with reasonable suspicion, while expressly 
purporting not to. 
Additionally, even the most reliable tip only justifies an 
investigative stop when it creates reasonable suspicion that ongoing 
criminal activity may be afoot.94 Therefore, in the context of a 911 
phone call reporting suspected drunk driving, the content of the tip 
must describe behavior that reasonably leads a police officer to 
89. Compare id. (transcribing the dispatchers as: “[s]howing southbound Highway 1 at mile
marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8–David–94925. Ran the reporting party off the 
roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago”), with FED. R. EVID. 803(1) 
(requiring a statement nearly contemporaneously with observance), and FED. R. EVID. 803(2) 
(requiring a statement made under the stress of excitement of the event). 
90. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689–90 (citing 47 CFR § 20.18(d)(1) (2013); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 148.3 (West 2014); id. § 653x (West 2010)). 
91. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1694 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s discussion of reliable 911
traceability has so little relevance to the present case that one must surmise it has been included 
merely to assure officers in the future that anonymous 911 accusations—even untraced ones—are 
not as suspect (and hence as unreliable) as other anonymous accusations. That is unfortunate.”). 
94. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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believe that a motorist is driving while intoxicated. To aid in its 
determination of which behavior is consistent with drunk driving, the 
Supreme Court looked to a study by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA).95 
The NHTSA study identified four principal categories of driving 
behaviors which suggest a motorist is driving under the influence: (1) 
problems in maintaining proper lane positioning; (2) speed and 
braking problems; (3) vigilance problems; and (4) judgment 
problems.96 More specifically, the study identifies behavior such as 
weaving, wide turns, near collisions, driving too quickly, driving too 
slowly, responding slowly to traffic signals, failure to signal, 
following too closely, and unsafe lane changes, among many others, 
as examples of behavior that predicts drunk driving at a statistical 
confidence rate of between 35 and 90 percent.97 
Of course, reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop 
requires far less than certainty of illegal activity.98 While the Court 
has never placed an exact percentage on how certain officers must 
be, Navarette expressly endorses the NHTSA’s findings of driving 
behaviors that predict drunk driving at confidence intervals as low as 
35 percent. It follows, then, that a police officer who receives an 
anonymous report complaining of any of the more than twenty 
driving behaviors identified in the NHTSA study can pull over the 
identified car on suspicion of drunk driving.99 
As a result of the broad array of behavior that suggests drunk 
driving, almost any report of less-than-ideal driving, even absent an 
assertion that the tipster believes the offending driver is indeed 
drunk, will give police the necessary reasonable suspicion to execute 
an investigative stop. This result, enabled by the logic and holding of 
the Navarette decision, is repugnant to any traditional concept of 
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.100 
95. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 55, at 4–5.
96. Id. at 4.
97. Id. at 5.
98. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
99. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 55, at 5.
100. See U.S. CONST. Amend. IV; see also Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Law enforcement agencies follow closely our judgments on matters such as this, 
and they will identify at once our new rule: So long as the caller identifies where the car is, 
anonymous claims of a single instance of possibly careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, 
will support a traffic stop. This is not my concept, and I am sure would not be the Framers’, of a 
people secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).  
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B. Navarette Is Significantly More Analogous to J.L. than to White.
The facts of Navarette are difficult to distinguish from those of
Florida v. J.L.101 At best, the greatest distinction is that the tipster in 
J.L. did not explain how he knew that the black male had a gun,102
while the Navarette tipster had personal knowledge of reckless
driving because she was allegedly run off the road.103 However, both
tips contained only factual assertions as to easily observable details
of the subject to be searched—the black male in J.L. and the silver
truck in Navarette—and did not predict any future activity that
necessarily suggested personal knowledge that could be the basis for
reliability.104 The most that could be said of the predictive value of
the Navarette tip, which was not articulated by the Navarette tipster
but was instead inferred from her story, was where along the
Highway the police could expect to find the offending driver.105
Nevertheless, the Navarette Court concluded that the case 
presented a situation more similar to White than to J.L.106 However, 
the White tip predicted future activity that was not readily observable 
or otherwise knowable to someone who did not have personal 
knowledge of the activities described within the tip.107 In contrast, 
the Navarette tip shares nothing more with the White tip than that 
each tip described a car with sufficient specificity for police to 
identify the vehicle on the road. Such a description, alone, would not 
have previously risen to the level of reliability and predictive content 
necessary to support reasonable suspicion for an investigate stop. 
Therefore, at least in the context of reports of erratic driving, 
Navarette represents a tremendous expansion of police power to 
detain and investigate the purported subject of an anonymous tip.108 
101. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
102. Id. at 271.
103. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. For a more detailed discussion of the connection between
one instance of reckless driving and suspicion of the ongoing crime of drunk driving, see Part 
V.A.2, supra.
104. See J.L., 266 U.S. at 268–69; see Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686.
105. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87.
106. See id. at 1692 (“Like White, this is a ‘close case.’”).
107. Id. at 1688.
108. Navarette does not represent the first time the Court has inconsistently applied
exceptions in the arena of DUI investigations. Compare Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that a suspicionless DUI checkpoint is constitutional), with City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding that a suspicionless drug checkpoint is 
unconstitutional). 
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C. Predicting the Future After Navarette
As a practical reality, the Court’s decision in Navarette will 
have broad-sweeping consequences for reasonable suspicion based 
on anonymous tips. In arguing the case, California’s primary position 
was that the governmental interest in stopping drunk driving and 
protecting citizens was so great that the reasonable suspicion 
required to justify an investigative stop was necessarily lower than in 
other cases.109 Notably, both the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Navarette wholly omitted any discussion of this position.110 
While a cursory reading of the opinion might suggest that the 
Court implicitly rejected California’s argument for an augmented 
balancing test, a more in-depth examination reveals that California, 
and by extension all state and federal governments, got far more than 
what they argued for in their brief.111 
As discussed in Section V.A.1, the Court found that a tip 
containing either a present sense impression or excited utterance is 
inherently reliable. And as discussed in Section V.A.2, the Court also 
reasoned that a tip recorded through 911 is more reliable because the 
call can be traced back to the tipster, and a false tip might subject 
him to criminal liability. In sum, these two justifications amount to 
an easy-to-satisfy formula for finding reasonable suspicion based on 
anonymous tips because most reports of emergencies are placed 
through 911 and describe events that took place recently enough to 
qualify, under Navarette, as present sense impressions or excited 
109. Respondent’s Brief On The Merits at 10, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014)
(No. 12-9490), 2013 WL 6673706, at *10, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/12 
-9490_resp.authcheckdam.pdf (“[T]he importance of the governmental interest is an
indispensable component of reasonableness balancing.”). Indeed, the Argument section of
California’s brief consists of six sections, the point headings for four of which contain the phrase
“governmental interest.” Id. at ii–iii. California’s position was supported by the United States,
thirty-two other states and the District of Columbia. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 19–25, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-9490),
2013 WL 6805695, at *19–25; Brief of Florida, 31 other states, and the District of Columbia as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent, State of California at 21–24, Navarette v. California,
134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-9490), 2013 WL 6805695, at *21–24.
110. See generally Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
111. The Court appeared motivated to provide a clear rule for law enforcement officers,
which had previously been missing in cases involving DUI stops. E.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 
S. Ct. 1552, 1569 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“But the
circumstances in drunk driving cases are often typical, and the Court should be able to offer 
guidance on how police should handle cases.”). The same judges that did not fully join the 
majority opinion in McNeely joined the majority in Navarette. Id. at 1556.   
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utterances. This formula can be satisfied in multiple scenarios 
beyond drunk driving, including situations where the governmental 
interest may not be as high, or where such interest is radically 
different from the interest of protecting the public’s safety by 
eliminating drunk driving.112 Instead, the governmental interest in 
responding to 911 calls supplants the governmental interest intimated 
by the factual circumstances of the particular emergency reported 
within the call, and satisfies the reasonable suspicion requirement in 
one step. 
In today’s day and age of mass data storage, nearly all 911 calls 
are recorded and, in most states, copies of all emergency calls are 
even made available to the public.113 Because of such laws, after 
Navarette there is no doubt that a police officer can constitutionally 
act on any tip placed with 911, so long as the tip provides some 
reason to believe that any criminal activity is ongoing.114 Simply put, 
the Fourth Amendment requires more before police officers may 
constitutionally initiate a search and seizure. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s holding in Navarette allows police to 
constitutionally perform an investigative stop in situations where 
they previously would not have had reasonable suspicion to do so. 
Going forward, with this precedent in mind, police will almost 
always be justified in deciding to pull over a motorist to investigate 
an anonymous report of drunk driving. The “evil” of this result is not 
immediately apparent. After all, no police officer or judge wants to 
explain to a grieving mother that her son was killed by a drunk driver 
112. At oral argument, the Court spent considerable time discussing hypotheticals involving
anonymous tips describing a bomb or a kidnapped girl. E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–
20, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-9490). In particular, Chief Justice 
Roberts expressed doubt about a rule in Navarette that would limit police officer’s ability to 
constitutionally act on anonymous tips dealing with such important subjects. Id.   
113. See State Laws Relating to Confidentiality of 9-1-1 Call Recordings and Photographs of
Emergency Scenes, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/confidentiality-of 
-911-call-recordings.aspx (last updated Dec. 27, 2013) (surveying state law and concluding that
only twelve states place restrictions on 911 call recordings).
114. Although the foundation for such a rule had been laid since as early as J.L., the Court
had never previously authorized such an exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement of a 
Terry stop. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274–76 (2000) (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, 
C.J., concurring) (opining that an anonymous tip is reliable when an anonymous informant places
his identity at risk through a voice recording).
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because, despite an anonymous tip reporting the motorist as a 
potential drunk driver, the police officer was constitutionally 
restricted to following the vehicle until he personally observed 
erratic driving behavior that would justify an investigative stop. The 
Navarette rule serves to protect the son’s life, whether he is the 
drunk driver that is the subject of the anonymous tip or the innocent 
victim, by allowing police to immediately stop a car that was the 
subject of an anonymous tip. 
Instead, the “evil” of Navarette—the previously impermissible 
incursion into Fourth Amendment rights—lies in the logic by which 
the Court reached its decision. The Court’s reasoning is unlikely to 
influence police in the line of duty who can premise an investigatory 
stop on the most minor of moving violations, including failure to 
show a turn signal and driving too quickly or too slowly.115 On the 
other hand, Navarette will be tremendously influential to the trial and 
magistrate judges who are tasked daily with assessing the 
constitutionality of police officers’ actions. The signal to them is 
clear: police always have reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry 
stop based on an anonymous report of subpar driving behavior. 
More dire still, an anonymous tip left through 911 that provides 
information regarding ongoing criminal activity—DUI-related or 
not—must now be given a presumption of reliability because the 911 
call is recorded. As such, Navarette portends to recreate and 
significantly lower the standard by which all anonymous tips are 
deemed to give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a police 
investigative stop. The inevitable effect is that all American citizens 
are less secure in their Fourth Amendment right to freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
115. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 55, at 4–5.
